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1Fingerprinting with Minimum Distance
Decoding
Abstract
This work adopts an information theoretic framework for the design of collusion-resistant cod-
ing/decoding schemes for digital fingerprinting. More specifically, the minimum distance decision rule
is used to identify 1 out of t pirates. Achievable rates, under this detection rule, are characterized
in two distinct scenarios. First, we consider the averaging attack where a random coding argument
is used to show that the rate 1/2 is achievable with t = 2 pirates. Our study is then extended to
the general case of arbitrary t highlighting the underlying complexity-performance tradeoff. Overall,
these results establish the significant performance gains offered by minimum distance decoding as
compared to other approaches based on orthogonal codes and correlation detectors which can support
only a sub-exponential number of users (i.e., a zero rate). In the second scenario, we characterize the
achievable rates, with minimum distance decoding, under any collusion attack that satisfies the marking
assumption. For t = 2 pirates, we show that the rate 1 − H(0.25) ≈ 0.188 is achievable using an
ensemble of random linear codes. For t ≥ 3, the existence of a non-resolvable collusion attack, with
minimum distance decoding, for any non-zero rate is established. Inspired by our theoretical analysis, we
then construct coding/decoding schemes for fingerprinting based on the celebrated Belief-Propagation
framework. Using an explicit repeat-accumulate code, we obtain a vanishingly small probability of
misidentification at rate 1/3 under averaging attack with t = 2. For collusion attacks which satisfy
the marking assumption, we use a more sophisticated accumulate repeat accumulate code to obtain a
vanishingly small misidentification probability at rate 1/9 with t = 2. These results represent a marked
improvement over the best available designs in the literature.
EDICS WAT-FING
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital fingerprinting is a paradigm for protecting copyrighted data against illegal distribution
[1]. In a nutshell, a distributor, i.e., the provider of copyrighted data, wishes to distribute its data
D among a number of licensed users. Each licensed copy is identified with a mark, which will
be referred to as a fingerprint in the sequel, composed of a set of redundant digits embedded
inside the copyrighted data. The locations of the redundant digits are kept hidden from the users
and are only known to the distributor. Their positions, however, remain the same for all users.
2If any user re-distributes its data in an unauthorized manner, it will be easily identified by its
fingerprint. However, several users may collude to form a coalition enabling them to produce an
unauthorized copy which is difficult to trace. In the literature, the colluding members are typically
referred to as pirates or colluders. Hence, the need arises for the design of collusion-resistant
digital fingerprinting techniques. Our work develops an information theoretic framework for the
design of low complexity pirate-identification schemes.
To enable a succinct development of our results, we first consider the widely studied averaging
attack [2]. The colluders, in this strategy, average their media contents to produce the forged
copy. An explicit fingerprinting code construction for this attack was proposed in [2]. In this
construction, however, the maximum number of users M , grows only polynomially with the fin-
gerprinting code-length n (more precisely M = O(n2)). Clearly, this rate of growth corresponds
to a zero rate in the information theoretic sense. This motivates our pursuit for a fingerprinting
scheme which supports an exponentially growing number of users, with the code-length, while
allowing for low complexity pirate-identification strategies. Towards this goal, we use a random
coding argument to establish the existence of a rate 0.5 linear fingerprinting code which achieves
a vanishingly small probability of misidentification when 1) Only t = 2 pirates are involved in
the averaging attack and 2) The low complexity minimum distance (MD) decoder is used to
identify one of the two pirates. The enabling observation is the intimate connection between the
scenario under consideration and the binary erasure channel (BEC). This result is then extended
to the general case with an arbitrary coalition size t where the tradeoff between complexity and
performance is highlighted.
Building on our analysis for the averaging attack, we then proceed to fingerprinting strategies
which are resistant to more general forging techniques. More specifically, we adopt the marking
assumption first proposed in [1]. In this framework, the pirates attempt to identify the positions
occupied by the fingerprinting digits by comparing their copies. Afterwards, they can only modify
the identified coordinates, in any desired way, to minimize the probability of traceability. The
validity of the marking assumption hinges on the assumption that any modification to the data
content D will damage it permanently. This prevents the users from modifying any location in
which they do not identify as a fingerprinting digit since it may be a data symbol. Boneh and
Shaw [1] were the first to construct fingerprinting codes that are resistant to attacks that satisfy
the marking assumption. This approach was later extended in [3] using the idea of separating
3codes [4]. To the best of our knowledge, the best available explicit binary fingerprinting codes
are the low rate codes presented in [3]. For example, for t = 2, the best available code has a
rate≈ 0.0092. More recently, upper and lower bounds on the binary fingerprinting capacity for
t = 2 and t = 3 were derived in [5]. The decoder used in [5], however, was based on exhaustive
search, and hence, would suffer from an exponentially growing complexity in the code length.
This prohibitive complexity motivates our proposed approach. In this paper, we show that using
linear fingerprinting codes and MD decoding, one can achieve rates less than 0.188 when the
coalition size is t = 2. Unfortunately, the proposed approach does not scale for t ≥ 3. This
negative result calls for a more sophisticated identification technique inspired by the analogy
between our set-up and multiple access channels. Our results in this regard will be reported
elsewhere.
Since the complexity of the exact MD decoder can be prohibitive when the code-length
is long, we develop a low complexity belief-propagation (BP) identification approach [6][7].
This detector only requires a linear complexity in n, and offer remarkable performance gain
over the best known explicit constructions for fingerprinting [3][2]. For example, we propose
a modified iterative decoder tailored for the averaging attack with t = 2. Using this decoder
along with an explicit repeat-accumulate (RA) fingerprinting code, we achieve a vanishingly
small probability of misidentification for rates up to 1/3. For the marking assumption set-up, we
achieve a vanishingly small misidentification probability for rates up to 1/9 using the recently
proposed class of low rate accumulate repeat accumulate (ARA) codes [8]. It is worth noting
that these results represent a marked improvement over the state of the art in the literature.
Furthermore, one would expect additional performance enhancement by optimizing the degree
sequences of the codes (which is beyond the scope of this work).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the mathematical
notations and formally define our problem setup. Then we explore the theoretical limits of
fingerprinting using the MD decoder in Sections III and IV. The simulation results based on the
BP framework are presented in Section V. Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Throughout the paper, random variables and their realizations are denoted by capital letters and
corresponding smaller case letters, respectively. Deterministic vectors are denoted by bold-face
4letters. We denote the entropy function by H(·), with the argument being the probability mass
function. Furthermore, for simplicity, we abbreviate H(p, 1 − p) by H(p), where 1 ≥ p ≥ 0.
For two functions of n, we write a(n) .= b(n) if: lim
n→∞
1
n
a(n)
b(n)
= 1, for example,
(
n
d
) .
= 2nH(
d
n
)
.
The Hamming distance between two vectors x1,x2 is denoted by dH(x1,x2). Without loss of
generality, we assume that the number of users is M , and hence, a coalition U of size t is a subset
of {1, 2, . . . ,M} where |U | = t. The goal of the coalition, in a nutshell, is to produce a forged
fingerprint, y, such that the distributor will not be able to trace it back to any of its members. In
the following, we first introduce the notation that will be used for a general attack satisfying the
marking assumption and then specify our notations for the averaging attack scenario. It should be
noted that our formulation follows in the footsteps of [5]. For completeness, however, we repeat
it here. As mentioned in [1], deterministic fingerprinting under the marking assumption is not
possible in general. Therefore, the distributor needs to employ some kind of randomization which
leads to a collection of binary codes (F,G) composed of K pairs of encoding and decoding
functions as:
fk : {1, 2, . . . ,M} → {0, 1}
n (1)
gk : {0, 1}
n → {1, 2, . . . ,M}
k = 1, 2, . . . , K,
where the code rate R is log2M
n
and the secret key, k is a random variable employed to randomize
the codebook. This way, the exact codebook utilized for fingerprinting is kept hidden from the
users. It should be noted that, adhering to common conventions in cryptography, the family of
encoding and decoding functions as well as the probability distribution of the secret key, p(k),
are known to all users. Finally, it is clear from the definition of gk that the objective of the
distributer, in our formulation, is to identify only one of the colluders correctly.
For simplicity of presentation, let’s assume that t = 2 then the fingerprints corresponding to
the coalition of users (also referred to as pirates or colluders), u1, u2 are denoted by {x1,x2}.
The marking assumption implies that position i is undetectable to the two colluders if x1i = x2i,
otherwise it is called detectable [1]. Those undetectable coordinates can not be changed by the
pirates, and hence, the set of all possible forged copies is give by
E(U) = {y ∈ {0, 1}n | yi = x1i, ∀i undetectable}. (2)
5In general, a coalition U may utilize a random strategy that satisfies the marking assumption
to produce y. That is, if V (y | x1,x2) is the probability that y is created, given the coalition
{x1,x2}, then we have:
V (y | x1,x2) = 0 for all y 6∈ E(U). (3)
In this paper, we focus on the maximum probability of misidentification over the set of all
strategies which satisfy (3) (denoted by V in the sequel). Similar to [5], we average the probability
of misidentification over all possible coalitions leading to the following performance metric:
Pm(F,G) :=
1(
M
t
)∑
U
max
V ∈V
Pm(U, F,G, V ), (4)
where
Pm(U, F,G, V ) := EK
( ∑
y∈E(U),gk(y)/∈U
V (y | fk(U))
)
.
In the case of an averaging attack, we employ the typical assumption of mapping the binary
fingerprints into the antipodal alphabets {−1, 1} where the encoder now is defined as [2]
f : {1, 2, . . . ,M} → {−1,+1}n. (5)
As anticipated from the name, the forged copy is now given by:
y =
1
t
t∑
i=1
xi, (6)
where the addition is over real field. The decoder is now defined as
g : {Ay}
n → {1, 2, . . . ,M}, (7)
where Ay is the alphabets of y, for example, it is {−1, 0,+1} when t = 2. Misidentification
will happen if g(y) /∈ U . Note that for t = 2, if g(y) ∈ U , i.e., we trace one colluder correctly
then we can always trace another colluder correctly according to (6). In this special case, the
performance metric in (4) reduces to
P
a
m :=
1(
M
t
)∑
U
(g(y) /∈ U). (8)
6III. THE AVERAGING ATTACK
In this section, we investigate the theoretical achievable rate of fingerprinting code with
the minimum distance (MD) decoder under the averaging attack. First, we need the following
definition.
Definition 1: We say that the capacity of of an ensemble of fingerprinting codebooks E is RE
under MD decoding if
1) For M = 2nR with R < RE , the average probability of misidentification over the ensemble
Pm using MD decoding goes exponentially to zero as the codelength n goes to infinity.
2) Conversely, for M = 2nR with R > RE , there exists a constant δ > 0 such that Pm > δ
for sufficiently large block lengths.
Note that this converse in the previous definition is applicable only to a specific family of codes
similar to the approach taken in [6], [7]. We also call a rate is MD-achievable if only the first
part in Definition 1 is met. We are now ready to prove our first result.
Theorem 1: The fingerprinting capacity of the i.i.d codebook ensemble when t = 2 is RE =
0.5 (under the averaging attack and the MD decoder).
Proof: The encoder and decoder come as follows.
Encoder: The encoder chooses codewords uniformly and independently from all 2n different
vectors belonging to {0, 1}n, transfers the fingerprinting codeword alphabets from {0, 1} to
{−1,+1}, and assigns the fingerprints to the users.
Decoder: With the given forged fingerprint y, the decoder treats the position i where yi = 0 as
an erased position, and the others as unerased positions. Let E be the set of erasure positions
and E := [1 : n] \ E . Also let yE denote those components of y which are indexed by E . The
decoder will search the codebook to find the codeword which agrees with y in all unerased
positions yE . Once the decoder finds such a codeword, the decoder declares it as the pirate. A
misidentification occurs when the codeword of an innocent user z is consistent with y.
Achievability: For a small ε, we say the assigned fingerprints x1,x2 are close if dH(x1,x2) ≤
n(1
2
+ε), here the fingerprinting alphabets are {0, 1} before transformation. As shown in Appendix
7I-A, we know that with high probability, (x1,x2) are a close pair. Thus, given a small ǫ > 0,
|E | ≤ n(
1
2
+ ǫ), (9)
since the erasures happen when the bits of (x1,x2) are different. For the given forged fingerprint
y, z must agree with y in all n− |E | unerased positions, and can be −1 or +1 in the rest |E |
erased positions. The probability of choosing such codeword is upper-bounded by
2n∗(1/2+ǫ)/2n. (10)
By using the union bound, we know that for R < 1/2 − ǫ, the probability of misidentification
Pm tends to zero exponentially fast for sufficiently large codeword length n.
Converse: From (23) in the Appendix, we know that P (|E | ≥ n/2) > P (|E | = n/2) = δ,
where δ is non-vanishing with respect to codeword length n. For a fingerprinting codeword x,
we form xE as the components of x which are indexed by E . And we arrange all xE in the
fingerprinting codebook as rows of a 2nR × (n− |E |) array XE . The misidentification happens
if yE equals to more than two rows of XE . With R > 1/2, |E | ≥ n/2, and sufficiently large n,
2nR − 2 > 2(n−|E|) − 1. (11)
And the misidentification will happen with probability at least 1/3. From above, we know that if
R > 1/2, the misidentification probability will be larger than δ/3 for sufficiently large n which
concludes the proof.
Intuitively, the i.i.d generated codebook will result in |E | ≈ n/2 number of erased positions
with high probability [5]. Then the “channel” between one of the pirates x1 and the forged
fingerprint y can be approximated by a binary erasure channel (BEC) with erasure probability
1/2. From [9], we know that the capacity using the MD decoder of this channel is 1/2. However, in
the two-pirate fingerprinting system, there are always two codewords x1 and x2 in the codebook
which meet the MD decoding criteria. This is the fundamental difference between this system
and the classical BEC channel. In the BEC channel, with high probability, only one codeword
will meet the MD decoding criteria. As will be presented in Section V-A, this difference will
have an important implication on the design of Belief Propagation decoders for fingerprinting.
The following result shows that restricting ourselves to the class of linear fingerprinting does
8not entail any performance loss (at least from an information theoretic perspective)
Theorem 2: The fingerprinting capacity of the binary linear ensemble with t = 2 is RE = 0.5
(under the averaging attack and the MD decoder).
Proof: We consider the ensemble of binary linear codes of length n and dimension n− l
defined by the l×n parity check matrix H , where each entry of H is an i.i.d Bernoulli random
variable with parameter 1/2. The code rate R = 1− l/n.
Encoder: The encoder chooses one codebook from this linear code ensemble, transfers the
fingerprinting codeword alphabets from {0, 1} to {−1,+1}, and assigns the fingerprints to the
users.
Decoder: With the given forged fingerprint y, again the decoder treats the position i where
yi = 0 as an erased position, and the others as unerased positions. The decoder will also transfer
the alphabets of unerased positions from {−1,+1} back to {0, 1}. Let HE denote the submatrix
of H that consists of those columns of H which are indexed by the set of erasures E . In a similar
manner, let xE denote those components of the pirate’s fingerprint which are indexed by E , and
xE denote those components which are indexed by E . In the following, we assume that the
fingerprinting codeword alphabets are transferred back to {0, 1} and the addition is module-2.
Note that the true pirates x1 and x2 will result in the same xE = yE , where yE is defined as in
Theorem 1. From the parity check equations,
HEx
T
E = s
T, (12)
where sT := HEyTE is called the syndrome. The syndrome is known at the decoder. The decoder
solves these linear equations to find xE , combines it with the known xE = yE , and declares one
of the results as the pirate.
Achievability: We know that (12) has at least two solutions corresponding to the true pirates x1
and x2. The rank of l × |E | matrix HE must equal to |E | − 1 to make sure that there is only
two solutions. The decoder will declare an innocent user as the pirate if there are more than two
9solutions, iff HE has rank less than |E | − 1. This happens with probability
1−
Mb(l, |E |, |E | − 1)
2l|E| −Mb(l, |E |, |E |)
, (13)
where Mb(l1, m1, k1) denote the number of binary matrices with dimension l1×m1 and rank k1.
To make (13) approach zero as n increases, the second term in (13) must approach one as n
goes up. To show this, we first assume that |E |+nǫ1 ≤ l, where ǫ1 > 0 is a small number. And
according to (28) in Appendix II and [10], the second term in (13) equals
Mb(|E | − 1, l, |E | − 1)(2
|E| − 1)
2l|E| −Mb(|E |, l, |E |)
. (14)
From [10], for j = 0 . . . |E | − 1
Mb(|E | − j, l, |E | − j) =
|E|−j−1∏
p=0
(2l − 2p). (15)
Using this formula in (14) and dividing the nominator and denominator by Mb(|E |−1, l, |E |−1),
this term equals
2|E| − 1
2(|E|−1) + 2l[−1 +
∏|E|−2
p=0 1/(1− 2
p−l)]
. (16)
Note that nǫ1 ≤ l − |E |, each 2p−l approaches zero exponentially fast with n. By using Taylor
series on 1/(1− 2p−l), and with some simplifications, the denominator becomes
2(|E|−1) +
|E|−2∑
p=0
2p + 2|E| ∗ h.o.t. = 2|E| ∗ (1 + h.o.t.)− 1, (17)
where the higher order terms of the Taylor series are denoted by h.o.t and approach zero
exponentially fast. Using this result in (16), our claim is valid and (13) approaches zero as
n→∞ if |E |+ nǫ1 ≤ l.
As shown in Appendix I-B, |E | ≤ n(1/2+ ǫ) with high probability, we know that if n(1/2+
ǫ)+nǫ1 ≤ l, or R < 1/2−(ǫ+ǫ1), the probability of misidentification can be made arbitrary small.
Converse: From (26) in Appendix, we know that P (|E | ≥ n/2) > P (|E | = n/2) = δ, where
δ is non vanishing with respect to codeword length n. With R > 1/2 and sufficiently large
n, P (|E | − 1 > l) ≥ δ. In this case, the rank of HE is less than |E | − 1 and the syndrome
decoder will find at least three solutions of equation (12). The misidentification will happen
with probability at least 1/3 since. From above, we know that if R > 1/2, the probability will
10
be larger than δ/3 for sufficiently large n and it concludes the proof.
Next, our approach is generalized to coalitions with t > 2. The key to the following corollary
is to treat all alphabets other than ±1 in Ay of (7) as erasures.
Corollary 1: The rate 1
2(t−1)
is MD-achievable for fingerprinting under average attack with a
coalition of size t.
Proof: The encoder/decoder are the same as the ones in Theorem 1 except for the choices
of erasure positions as described previously. Note that yi 6= ±1 whenever the pirates’ fingerprints
bits are not the same at position i. Similar to [5], we know that with high probability, the i.i.d
generated codebooks will meet
|E | ≤ n
{
1−
1
2(t−1)
+ ǫ
}
.
Then, following in the footsteps of the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain our result.
The advantage of the MD decoder, used to obtain the previous result, is the universality for
all t. However, for each t, we can obtain higher rates by tailoring our encoder/decoder to this
specific case. To illustaret the idea, let’s consider the t = 3 case. Now, Ay = {±1,±13} and one
can achieve better performance by exploiting the information contained in the positions with
yi = ±
1
3
.
Theorem 3: The rate H(1
8
, 1
8
, 3
8
, 3
8
)−H(1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
) = 0.3113 is achievable for fingerprinting under
average attack with t = 3.
Proof: The encoder is the same as Theorem 1. As for the decoder, we first define X as
a random variable with P (X = ±1) = 1/2, and the random variable Y = (X + X2 +X3)/3,
where X2, X3 has the same distribution as X and (X,X2, X3) are independent. The transition
matrix of P (Y |X) is
Typically, we need a maximum likelihood (ML) decoder designed for the transition matrix
P (Y |X). Note that when t = 2, this decoder reduces to the one specified in Theorem 1. However,
11
X\
Y
-1 -1/3 1/3 1
-1 1
4
1
2
1
4
0
1 0 1
4
1
2
1
4
.
it is hard to investigate the performance of the ML decoder, and we use the jointly-typical
decoder defined in [9] as a lower-bound for the achievable rate of this decoder. Given a forged
fingerprint y, the decoder search the codebook to find the codeword such that this codeword
and y are jointly-typical with respect to P (X, Y ) . Once the decoder finds such a codeword, the
decoder declares it as the pirate.
Achievability : Without loss of generality, we can assume that the pirates indices are (1, 2, 3).
An event Ei occurs when the ith codeword and y are jointly typical, and the event Eci is its
complement. Then the probability of misidentification Pm is upper-bounded by
Pm ≤ P (E
c
1) + P (E
c
2) + P (E
c
3) +
∑
i 6=1,2,3
P (Ei).
From [9, Theorem 15.2.1], the first three terms can be made less than any arbitrary small
ǫ > 0 for sufficiently large n. And the last term is upper-bounded by
(M − 3)2−n(I(X;Y )−4ǫ),
So if R < I(X ; Y )− 4ǫ, Pm can be made arbitrary small for sufficiently large n. According to
the transition matrix of P (Y |X), we know that
I(X ; Y ) = H(
1
8
,
1
8
,
3
8
,
3
8
)−H(
1
4
,
1
2
,
1
4
),
which concludes the proof
IV. THE MARKING ASSUMPTION
Having studied the special case of averaging attack, we now proceed to the case when the
coalition can employ any strategy as long as the marking assumption is satisfied. The following
result establishes the achievable rate of random fingerprinting codes with MD decoding
12
Theorem 4: For all rates less than 1−H(0.25) there exists an MD-achievable fingerprinting
code, when t = 2.
Proof: We use a random coding argument to prove our result. We construct the following
ensemble of binary random codes as in Theorem 1: Binary random vectors (fingerprints) of
length n are assigned to the M = 2nR users where each coordinate is chosen independently with
equal probability of being 0, 1. For a small ε, we say the assigned fingerprints x1,x2 are close
if dH(x1,x2) ≤ n(12 + ε). If the pair (x1,x2) is close we denote it by x1
C
↔ x2, otherwise for
a non-close pair we write: x1
N
↔ x2. Given a forged fingerprint y, the average probability of
misidentification over this ensemble can be upper bounded by:
Pm(y|x1
C
↔ x2) + P (x1
N
↔ x2),
where Pm(y|x1
C
↔ x2) is the misidentification probability when y is produced by a close pair
(x1,x2) and P (x1
N
↔ x2) is the probability that the pirates did not constitute a close pair. Both
probability are averaged over the random coding ensemble. By the following argument, we will
show that these probabilities goes exponentially to zero as n goes to infinity hence the proof.
In Appendix I-A we have proved that P (x1
N
↔ x2) goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Now
we turn to Pm(y|x1
C
↔ x2). Since dH(x1,x2) < n(12 + ε), the Hamming distance of the forged
copy y with at least one of the pirates must be less than h(n) := n(1
4
+ ε
2
) due to the marking
assumption. Without loss of generality, we assume this pirate to be x1. Using minimum Hamming
distance decoding, misidentification occurs if there is another binary vector z of length n in the
codebook such that dH(y, z) ≤ dH(y,x1). The total probability of this event in the random
ensemble is upper-bounded by
M
∑h(n)
i=1
(
n
i
)
2n
.
= M ∗ 2−n(1−H(0.25)),
where the union bound is used. The probability of misidentification in a random code of size
M = 2nR is at most
2−n(1−H(0.25)−R).
The above probability goes exponentially to zero as n→∞ for all rates R < 1−H(0.25).
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Intuitively, with a high probability, the forged copy will be produced by a pair of close pirates.
Therefore, the minimum Hamming distance between the pirates x1 and the forged copy y is
approximately n/4 implying that we can treat the ”channel” between them as a binary symmetric
channel (BSC) with crossover probability 1/4 (whose capacity is 1 − H(0.25) [9]). Next, we
extend our result to binary linear codes
Theorem 5: For all rates less than 1 −H(0.25), there exists a linear MD-achievable finger-
printing code, when t = 2.
Proof: Consider the ensemble of binary linear codes with binary parity generator matrix
G where elements of G are chosen equally and independently from {0, 1} similar to Theorem
2. The size of matrix G is (n− l)× n, with rate R = (n− l)/n and the codeword length n. It
should also be noted that in the following all matrix multiplications and additions are done in
module-2 unless otherwise stated. In order to randomize the codebook, the distributor employs
the following strategy: Generating the secret key vectors as independent binary random vectors
of length n, whose coordinates are chosen to be 0, 1 independently with probability 1/2. We
denote the vector indexed by secret key k as k. The vector k is added in the binary domain
to the codeword, and the resulting vector is assigned to the corresponding user. Note that this
operation will not change the detectable positions, where the codewords are the different. With
forged copy y, the decoder subtracts k and performs MD decoding. As we mentioned earlier,
the secret key is unknown to the users and is only known to the distributor.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, we can upper-bound the probability of misidentification
as
Pm(y|x1
C
↔ x2) + P (x1
N
↔ x2). (18)
In Appendix I-B we have established that over the ensemble of linear random codes described
above, P (x1
N
↔ x2) also goes to zero as the code length goes to infinity. Now let us consider
Pm(y|x1
C
↔ x2). The codes assigned to the users which are the result of the addition of a secret
key to a linear code can be written as:
uG+ k (19)
14
where u is an information message vector. Notice that the ensemble defined by (19) is the same
as ensemble of coset codes introduced in [11]. In our proof, we need the following lemmas for
the coset codes ensemble that are proved in [11].
Lemma 1: The probability of any binary vector v being a codeword in the ensemble defined
by (19) is equal to 2−n.
Lemma 2: Let v1, v2 be the codewords corresponding to two different information sequences
u1, u2. Then over the ensemble of codes, v1, v2 are statistically independent.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, again due to the marking assumption we can assume
dH(y,x1) < h(n). Using MD decoding, misidentification occurs if there is another binary vector
z of length n in the codebook such that dH(y, z) ≤ dH(y,x1). The total number of binary vectors
for which dH(y, z) ≤ dH(y,x1) can be upper bounded by:
∑h(n)
i=1
(
n
i
) .
= 2nH(0.25). By Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 over the ensemble each of such vectors z is independent of x1 with probability
2−n. Therefore, the total probability of this event in the ensemble is upper-bounded by:
M ∗ 2−n(1−H(0.25)),
where again the union bound is used. The probability of misidentification in a random coset
code of size M = 2nR is at most
2−n(1−H(0.25)−R).
The above probability goes exponentially to zero as n→∞ for all rates R < 1−H(0.25).
When the coalition size, t is larger than two, the minimum distance decoding will fail due to
the following argument. Let t = 3 and assume that the forged copy is produced by
y = x1 + x2 + x3,
where the additions are modulo-2. It is easy to check that this attack satisfies the marking
assumption. For t > 3 the coalition can consider only three of the pirates, ignore the rest and
apply this attack. Following the footsteps in the proof of Theorem 3, it is easy to see that the
MD-achievable rate is zero. Indeed, it can also be shown that the resulting “BSC channel” has
crossover probability 1/2, and this negative result is obtained [9].
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V. BELIEF PROPAGATION FOR FINGERPRINTING
Implementing the exact minimum distance decoder may require prohibitive complexity (espe-
cially for large codeword lengths). This motivates our approach of using the BP framework to
approximate the MD decoder. More specifically, in this section, we present explicit constructing
of graph-based codes, along with the corresponding BP decoders, which are tailored for the
fingerprinting application.
A. Averaging attack
As remarked earlier, the two-pirate averaging attack will produce a “channel” almost equivalent
to the classical BEC. This inspires the use of graphical codes based on the Repeat Accumulate
(RA) framework [12], such as the nonsystematic irregular RA code of [13] and the irregular
ARA code of [14], which were shown to be capacity achieving for the BEC. In our simulations,
we use the original regular RA codes of [12] due to their simplicity and good performance for
low rate scenarios. It is worth noting that all the techniques discussed in the sequel can be applied
directly to the irregular codes presented in [13], [14]. For the sake of completeness we review
briefly the encoding procedure for regular RA codes: first, the information bits are repeated a
constant number of times (by a regular repetition code) and interleaved. The interleaved bits
are then accumulated to generate the code symbols. Similarly, one can employ the standard BP
iterative decoding approach [15] to identify the pirates. However, we argue next that significant
performance improvement can be obtained via a key modification to the iterative decoder∗.
It is well known that the standard iterative algorithm will fail if a stopping set exists in the
erased positions [10]. Unfortunately, a stopping set always will exist in the erased positions
produced by averaging attack. To see this, it is more convenient to represent the RA code using
the appropriate bipartite Tanner graph containing a set of variables V = {v1, v2, . . .} and a set
of check nodes. The reader are referred to [12], [13], [14] for more details on the graphical
representation of RA codes. A stopping set S is, therefore, a subset of V , such that all neighbors
of S are connected to S at least twice. The standard BP algorithm can now be stated as the follows.
[Standard BP]:
∗in the following, the fingerprinting codeword alphabets are {0, 1} after decoder transformation and the addition is module-2.
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1) Find a check node that satisfies the following
• This check node is not labelled as “finished”.
• The values of all but one of the variable nodes connected to the check node are known.
Set the value of the unknown erased one to be the module-2 addition of the other variable
nodes. And label that check node as “finished”.
2) Repeat step 1 until all check nodes are labeled as “finished” or the decoding cannot
continue further. If the latter happens, declare the decoding fail.
It is now easy to see that, in the stopping set, every check node is connected to at least two
erased variable nodes and the decoder will halt at this point. The following result establishes
the limitation of the standard BP decoder in our fingerprinting scenario
Proposition 1: Let VB1 and VB2 be the set of values of the variable node set V corresponding
to pirate fingerprints x1 and x2, respectively. And let Vd be the set of variable nodes where the
corresponding values in VB1 and VB2 are different. Then Vd is a stopping set.
Proof: This statement is proved by contradiction. First we assume that Vd is not a stopping
set. It means that ∃j ∈
⋃
i∈Vd
N(i) where the check node j has only one neighbor i′ in Vd. Here
we denote the neighbor of node i in the graph as N(i). For the neighboring variable nodes of
this check node, we have
 VB1(i) = VB2(i) ∀i 6= i
′, i ∈ N(j)
VB1(i
′) = VB2(i
′) + 1 i′ ∈ N(j).
(20)
However, from the check equation of this check node∑
i∈N(j)
VB1(i) =
∑
i∈N(j)
VB2(i) = 0, (21)
where the addition is module-2. It is obvious that (20) contradicts with (21) since the total
number of variable nodes such that VB1(i) 6= VB2(i), i ∈ N(j) should be even. Thus Vd is a
stopping set.
Since, under averaging attack, the bits of the forged fingerprint will be erased whenever the pirate
fingerprints are different in the Tanner graph, then Vd will be always contained in the erased
17
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Fig. 1. Proper variable node to be chosen in step 2 of proposed modified BP algorithm for two-pirate averaging attack.
positions and the iterative decoder will fail. The modification, presented next, will break the
stopping set Vd, and hence, allow the iterative decoder to proceed forward. The key observation
is that for every erased position in Vd, the pirate fingerprints can only be represented by only
two combinations {0, 1} or {1, 0}. It allows us to choose one variable node in this stopping set,
and set its value to 1. The modified forged fingerprint will then be “closer” to one of the pirate
fingerprints. In summary, the decoder becomes
[Modified BP for fingerprinting]:
1) Perform the standard BP algorithm, remove all the “finished” labels and Go to step 2
2) Choose a proper variable node in Vd (different from previous choices), and set its value to
1. If the decoder has executed this step more than Nmax times, declare a decoding failure
and exit.
3) Run the standard BP on the new graph. If the decoder fails, reset the variable nodes to
their original values and Go to step 2.
In step 2, we must make sure that the chosen variable node breaks the stopping set Vd. The
neighboring variables nodes of a degree-3 check node in RA code are good choices. From the
check equations in (21), the erased variables nodes will appear in pair. If we set the value of
one of the two erased neighbor variable node vi as 1, this degree-3 check node is connected
to Vd \ vi with only one edge. Then Vd \ vi is not a stopping set. We also need to choose the
variable node which will affect as much other variable nodes in Vd \ vi as possible by setting its
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Fig. 2. Probability of misidentification under two-pirate averaging attack using RA codes with different rates and modified BP
algorithm without variable node selection.
value. Since all check nodes of RA code are degree-3, we choose such variable node vi in the
degree-2 variable-node-chain of RA code, as shown in Fig. 1. The check node is depicted as ⊞,
the unerased variable nodes as black circle and the erased ones as hollow circle. Furthermore,
each variable node which will benefit from guessing vi is shown as hollow circle with the letter
“A” in the figure. The key observation is that, for node vi, the two neighboring accumulator
output nodes, i.e., vi−1 and vi+1, correspond to non-erased bits. This implies that that setting the
value of vi will at least affect 6 other variable nodes of rate 1/3 RA code.
Now, we are ready to report our simulation results. First, we show the performance of proposed
algorithm with different rate RA codes without variable node selection in Fig 2 (i.e., we select
the first unerased variable node in the RA degree-2 variable-node-chain and set Nmax = 1).
Here, the number of information bits n/R = 16384 is fixed for all rates, to make the number of
users M the same. We observe that, without selecting the variable node as shown in Fig 1, the
19
0 1 2
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
N
max
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
id
en
tif
ic
at
io
n
Fig. 3. Probability of misidentification under two-pirate averaging attack using rate 1/3 RA code and modified BP algorithm
with different Nmax.
probability of misidentification P¯ am is high for rate 1/3. This performance can be improved by
the proposed algorithm for variable node selection and increasing Nmax as depicted in Fig. 3.
Finally, in Fig. 4 we report P¯ am with different code length n and Nmax = 2.
Finally, we note that our algorithm is similar, in spirit, to the proposed guessing algorithm in
[7]. The critical difference is that the structure of our problem ensures that the guessed bit always
corresponds to one of the pirates, and hence, we do not need to worry about the possibility of
contradictions as the iteration proceeds.
B. The Marking Assumption: The Memoryless Attack
In this subsection, we report our simulation results for the two-pirate memoryless attack. In
this attack, when the pirates encounter a detectable position, they choose 0, 1 independently and
with equal probability to form the forged copy. We use rates 1/8, 1/9 and 1/10 ARA codes
based on the low rate protographs presented in [8]. The protographs of the codes are depicted
20
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Fig. 4. Probability of misidentification under two-pirate averaging attack using rate 1/3 RA code and modified BP algorithm
with different code lengths n.
in Fig 5. For a formal description of the ARA codes, we refer the interested readers to [8], [14]
and references therein. Decoding is done iteratively using the BP framework with a maximum
number of iterations equal to 60. Here, the decoder treats the forged fingerprint as the output of
a BSC with crossover probability equal to 0.25. In Fig 6, the probability of misidentification P¯m
is depicted versus different code lengths for different rates. As shown in the figure, it is clear a
vanishing small misidentification probability is achievable for rate 1/9 which is about an order of
magnitude higher than the best result available in the literature for explicit fingerprinting codes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper developed an information theoretic framework for the design of low complexity
coding/decoding techniques for fingerprinting. More specifically, we established the superior
performance of the minimum distance decoder and validated our theoretical claims via explicit
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Fig. 5. Protographs of rate 1/8, 1/9, 1/10 ARA codes.
construction of BP encoding/decoding schemes. In the averaging attack scenario, our framework
was inspired by the equivalence between our problem and the BEC. We also showed that the
worst case attack, under the marking assumption, is equivalent to a BSC with a cross-over
probability equal to 1/4. Our approach for the averaging attack can handle arbitrary coalition
sizes, whereas it was shown that the MD decoder recover from marking assumption attacks only
with coalitions composed of two pirates. This negative result motives our current investigations on
more sophisticated approaches for pirate tracing using the intimate connection between collusion
in digital fingerprinting and multiple access channels.
APPENDIX I
ON NON-CLOSE PAIRS IN RANDOM ENSEMBLE
We will examine the probability of non-close pairs for random i.i.d and linear codebook
ensembles, and show that these events will not happen with high probability.
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Fig. 6. Probability of misidentification for ARA codes with different rates and code lengths, under two-pirate memoryless
attack.
A. i.i.d codebook ensemble
For a codebook C in the i.i.d ensemble and 1 ≤ d ≤ n, define the number of unordered pairs
of codewords (xi,xj) with i 6= j in C at distance d apart as
Sc(d) :=
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
Φ{dH(xi,xj) = d}, (22)
where Φ(·) is the indicator function. In [16], it is established that with probability going to one
as n→∞
Sc(d)
.
=

 2
n(2R+H( d
n
)−1) nδGV (2R) < d < n(1− δGV (2R))
0 otherwise,
(23)
where δGV (·) is the Gilbert-Varshamov distance which for 0 < R < 1, δGV (R) is defined as the
root δ < 0.5 of the equation H(δ) = 1−R. And δGV (R) is zero for R ≥ 1. Using (23), we can
write the probability of non-close pairs in the codes of the random ensemble as∑n(1−δGV (2R))
d>n(1/2+ǫ) 2
n(2R+H(d/n)−1)
22nR
<
n2n(2R−1+H(
1
2
+ǫ))
22nR
. (24)
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which goes exponentially to zero as n→∞.
B. Random binary linear codebook ensemble
For a code C in the linear ensemble and 1 ≤ d ≤ n by the symmetry of linear codes we can
write
Sc(d) =
M∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
Φ{dH(xi,xj) = d} =
1
2
M∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
Φ{dH(xi,xj) = d} =
M
2
Nc(d)
.
= 2nRNc(d),
(25)
where Nc(d) :=
∑
j 6=iΦ{dH(xi,xj) = d}. In [16], it is shown that with probability going to one
as n→∞
Nc(d)
.
= {
2n(R+H(d/n)−1), nδGV (R) < d < n(1 − δGV (R))
0, otherwise.
(26)
Therefore, the average probability of a pair being non-close can be written as∑n(1−δGV (R))
d>n(1/2+ǫ) 2
n(2R+H(d/n)−1)
22nR
<
n2n(2R−1+H(
1
2
+ǫ))
22nR
, (27)
which again goes exponentially to zero as n→∞.
APPENDIX II
COMPUTATION OF Mb(l, |E |, |E | − 1)
We will show that for l ≥ |E |
Mb(l, |E |, |E | − 1) = Mb(|E | − 1, l, |E | − 1)(2
|E| − 1). (28)
To this end, by symmetry,
Mb(l, |E |, |E | − 1) = Mb(|E |, l, |E | − 1).
And from Appendix A of [10] and |E | ≤ l, the RHS equals to
Mb(|E |, l, |E | − 1) = Mb(|E | − 1, l, |E | − 1)2
|E|−1
+Mb(|E | − 1, l, |E | − 2)(2
l − 2|E|−2).
From Appendix A of [10], we also have the following recursive formula for j = 1 . . . |E | − 2
Mb(|E | − j, l, |E | − 1− j) = Mb(|E | − 1− j, l, |E | − 1− j)2
|E|−1−j
+Mb(|E | − 1− j, l, |E | − 2− j)(2
l − 2|E|−2−j).
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And Mb(|E |, l, |E | − 1) equals to
|E|−1∑
j=1
{
Mb(|E | − j, l, |E | − j)2
|E|−j
j−1∏
p=1
(2l − 2|E|−1−p)
}
(29)
+Mb(1, l, 0) ∗ (2
l − 1)
|E|−2∏
p=1
(2l − 2|E|−1−p),
where Mb(1, l, 0) = 1.
Finally, using (15) in (29),
Mb(|E |, l, |E | − 1) =
|E|∑
j=1
Mb(|E | − 1, l, |E | − 1)2
|E|−j,
And it is easy to check that the above formula equals to (28).
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